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Abstract
In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where
the downstream rms share the same decreasing returns technology of the
Cobb-Douglas type. We stress the di¤erences between the conclusions
obtained under this assumption and those resulting from the traditional
example considered in the literature, namely, a constant returns technol-
ogy. We nd that when rms use a decreasing returns technology rather
than a linear one: (i) the prot of a downstream rm can decrease, when
the upstream market is more competitive; (ii) the input price does not
tend to the corresponding marginal cost when the number of rms in both
markets tends to innite; (iii) double marginalization is lower.
Keywords: successive oligopolies, technology.
JEL classication: D43, L13, L22, L40
1 Introduction
The literature on successive oligopolies is traditionally based on examples. In
particular, the rms producing the nal output - downstream rms -, are as-
sumed to have the same Cobb-Douglas linear technology f(z) = z; with z de-
noting the amount of the single input used in the production process. This
simplifying assumption concerns, nevertheless, the crucial feature of industries
composed of a chain of markets. Indeed, the link between these markets is the
input demand of downstream rms to input suppliers, which depends on the
output technology. Consequently, while the homogeneous or linear transforma-
tion of the input to the output used in the existing literature, is suitable for
all industries in which the output production consists simply on the distribu-
tion of the good to the nal consumers, such assumption rules out most other
industries.
In this paper, we go on with the analysis of successive oligopolies in the same
spirit, but now introduce the alternative assumption that downstream rms
share the same decreasing returns technology. In order to allow for comparisons
between the two cases, we assume that the downstream rms use the Cobb-
Douglas production function f(z) =
p
z in the production process so that the
two technologies belong to the same class of production functions. Our concern
is whether the main conclusions reached under the constant returns assumption
still hold when this decreasing returns technology is substituted to the linear
one.
As it will be established in this paper, comparing the market solution ob-
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tained with the above decreasing returns technology with the linear case, shows
that several features are di¤erent from those observed under constant returns.
First, contrary to the linear case, the prot of a downstream rm, under the
decreasing returns technology, may well be decreasing with the number of up-
stream rms. Second, we nd that, again in contrast with the linear case,
increasing simultaneously the number of rms in both markets (upstream and
downstream), does not let the input market price to converge to the competitive
one, namely the marginal cost of producing the input.
Furthermore, comparing the market solutions corresponding to the example
of constant returns and decreasing returns technology in the output market, we
show that double marginalization is less severe under decreasing returns than
under constant returns, reecting the fact that the cost per unit is higher in the
latter than in the former. It is well-known that double-marginalization problem
can be alleviated or even be avoided through the use of more sophisticated
contracts (Tirole, 1989), but in industries like the cable TV in the US, the
business practice is to charge a price per subscriber, thus, in this indutry linear
pricing is applied and double marginalisation is an issue. Therefore, evaluating
its size gives insighits to the protability of eventual vertical aggreements.
Finally, we compare the e¤ects of mergers under both assumptions xing the
number of rms in each market. It turns out that, for this particular example,
the e¤ects of vertical integration on prices are going in opposite directions.
While the input and output prices both increase in the former when vertical
integration takes place, both decrease in the latter.
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The above discrepancies between market behavior corresponding to alterna-
tive technological conditions reveal how fragile are the theoretical conclusions
obtained when analyzing the interplay of rms strategies in successive mar-
kets. To get robust conclusions, a general theoretical framework for analyzing
successive oligopolistic markets is clearly required.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop two
games, one in the downstream and the other in the upstream market, to obtain
the industry equilibria. In section 2, according to the technology used in the
downstream market, we analyze the e¤ects of number of rms in prots, the
asymptotic properties of input and output prices, the size of double marginal-
ization, and nally, the e¤ects of technology on collusive agreements. Section 3
concludes.
2 Industry equilibria under constant returns
In this section, we recall the example of successive oligopolies considered in
the literature like in Gaudet and Van Long (1996), Ordover et al (1990), or
Salinger (1988). There are two markets, the downstream and upstream one, with
identical rms in each of them. In these markets, rms select non cooperatively
the quantities of the good they produce, the good produced by the upstream
rms serving as the only input used in the production of the nal output in
the downstream market. The link between the two markets follows from the
fact that the downstream rmsunit cost appears as the unit revenue for the
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upstream ones : the price paid for a unit of input for the rms in the former
constitutes the unit receipt for the rms in the latter. In the downstream market,
rms share the same technology f(z) given by
f(z) = z
as in Salinger (1988) and Gaudet and Van Long (1996). The prots i(qi; q i)
of the ith downstream rm at the vector of strategies (qi; q i) now obtains as
i(qi; q i) = (1  qi   k 6=iqk)qi   pzi;
with p denoting the input price. As a result of the strategic choice qi; each rm
i sends an input quantity signal zi(p) = qi to the upstream market. Given the
price p, the best reply of downstream rm i in the downstream game obtains as
zi(z i; p) =
1  p  k 6=izk
2
; i = 1; :::; n: (1)
We may compute the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the above downstream
game contingent on the price p: Dening zi = z for i = 1:::n; re-expressing
equation (1) and solving it in z; we get at the symmetric solution
z(p) =
1  p
(n+ 1)
; (2)
so that
q(p) =
1  p
(n+ 1)
: (3)
Now assume that there are m identical upstream rms who produce the input z
at the same linear total cost sj ; j = 1; ::;m;   0: We assume that  
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11 . This gives rise to another game whose players are the m upstream rms
with strategies sj ; j = 1; ::m: Given a n-tuple (s1;:::; sj ; ::sm) of input strategies
chosen by the upstream rms in the second stage game, the input price clearing
the upstream market must satisfy
n
(1  p)
(n+ 1)
= mk=1sk
so that, for this example, we get
p(mk=1sk) = 1 
n+ 1
n
mk=1sk: (4)
Given a vector of strategies (s1; :::sj ; ::sm); the jth upstream rms prot  j
writes as
 j(sj ; s j) = p(sj ; s j)sj   sj : (5)
Substituting (4) into the payo¤ function  j(sj ; s j) we have
 j(sj ; s j) =

1  n+ 1
n
mk=1sk

sj   sj ;
leading to the best response function
sj(s j) =
n(1  )
2(n+ 1)
  (1 + n)k 6=jsk
2(n+ 1)
; j = 1; :::;m:
Accordingly, at the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage game, we obtain
s(m;n) =
n (1  )
(n+ 1)(m+ 1)
:
6
Finally, the equilibrium price in the input market obtains as
p(m;n) =
1 +m
m+ 1
: (6)
Consequently, substituting this equilibrium price into the equilibrium quantities
zi of input bought by each downstream rm, as given by (2), we get
z(m;n) =
m(1  )
(n+ 1) (m+ 1)
;
so that
qi (m;n) =
m(1  )
(n+ 1) (m+ 1)
:
Accordingly, the resulting output price (m;n) in the downstream market ob-
tains as
(m;n) =
(1 +m+ n) +mn
(n+ 1) (m+ 1)
: (7)
The prot i(m;n) of a downstream rm at equilibrium in the downstream
game writes as
i(m;n) =
m2 (   1)2
(n+ 1)
2
(m+ 1)
2 : (8)
This market solution can be now used to determine some properties of prots
and prices.
Number of rms and prots
It is easily seen that @i(m;n)@m > 0: In the setup of successive oligopolies, an
increase of the number of input suppliers has a direct and an indirect e¤ect on the
prot of the downstream rms. The direct e¤ect is on the input price. A higher
7
m; clearly decreases the input price, @p
(m;n)
@m < 0; because competition in the
upstream market becomes ercer. The indirect e¤ect in on the output price. In
fact, the decrease of input price as a consequence of an increase of m, decreases
the output price @
(m;n)
@p
@p
@m < 0: In other words, given that downstream rms
behave competitively in the input market, a lower input cost, translates into a
lower output price in the downstream market.
Asymptotic properties of input and output prices
Another property that we can investigate is the e¤ect of entry of new rms
in each market. To do so, we use a replication procedure introduced by Debreu
and Scarf (1963) in the framework of a pure exchange economy: we replicate
a number of time, say  ;  = 1; 2; :::; the basic economy described above. In
the  th replica, there are n downstream and m upstream rms and the
downstream market demand is given by (1 Q). The corresponding prices of
the  th replica are the expressions (6) and (7), where n and m become n and
m: It can be easily shown2 that the market solution resulting from free entry
in each market obtains by taking the limit of these expressions when  ! 1:
We compute
lim
!1;
(m; n) = 
and
lim
!1; p
(m; n) = :
Thus, as expected, under constant returns, when the number of rms in each
market both tend to innity at the same speed, the equilibrium output price
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converges to its marginal cost, and similarly for the input price. Furthermore
both prices converge to their competitive counterpart.
In the following sections, using the example of a Cobb-Douglas function, we
investigate whether these properties still hold when the technology used by the
downstream rms has decreasing returns.
3 Industry equilibria under decreasing returns
In this section, we keep most of the traditional assumptions used in the constant
returns example proposed by the literature: linear demand in the downstream
market, identical production function for the downstream rms and identical
linear total cost for the upstream rms. Also we assume, as usual, that down-
stream rms are price takers in the input market. Thus, we are completely
in line with the traditional example considered in the literature on successive
oligopolies, but one : the production function of the downstream is no longer
linear, but with decreasing returns. Consider again n downstream rms facing
the linear demand (Q) = 1 Q in the downstream market. All of them share
the same technology f(z) to produce the output, which is now
q = f(z) =
p
z:
The prots of the ith downstream rm at the vector of strategies (qi; q i) obtains
as
i(qi; q i) = (1  qi   k 6=iqk)qi   pq2i :
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Given a vector of strategies (q1; :::qi; ::qn); the resulting input demand nk=1zk(p)
in the upstream market obtains as
nk=1zk(p) = 
n
k=1q
2
k:
The m identical upstream rms produce the input z at the same linear total
cost sj ; j = 1; ::;m;  > 0: Given a vector of strategies (s1; :::sj ; ::sm); the jth
upstream rms prot  j writes as
 j(sj ; s j) = p(sj ; s j)sj   sj : (9)
Given an n-tuple of strategies (q1; :::qi; ::qn) and am tuple of strategies (s1; :::sj
; ::sm); we may compute the symmetric Nash equilibrium of each of the above
games under the condition that the input price balances supply and demand in
the input market. The explicit values of the symmetric Nash equilibrium in each
of the above games are derived in Appendix 1.
Denoting (q(p); :::q(p); ::q(p)) and (s(p); :::s(p); ::s(p)) the symmetric
solution of each game, they must satisfy the equality
n (q(p))2 = ms(p): (10)
4 Number of rms and prots
In this section, we study how the prot of downstream rms depend on the
number of rms in the input market when output rms use a decreasing returns
technology. As we saw above, under oligopoly with a constant returns tech-
nology, decreasing linear production cost must necessarily increase downstream
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rmsprots. Accordingly, since increasing the number of upstream rms leads
to a decrease in the input price, the resulting prot of downstream oligopolists
must necessarily increase under a constant returns technology.
Does this simple reasoning still applies when returns are decreasing? It turns
out that this is not always the case.
Proposition 1 In spite of ercer competition, the prot of downstream rms
may well decrease with the number of rms in the upstream market. For in-
stance, when the number of rms in the downstream market does not exceed
3, prots of a downstream rm always decreases when the number of upstream
rms increases.
Proof. see appendix 3.
Similarly to the case of constant returns technology, an increase in the num-
ber of input suppliers has two e¤ects, one on the input price and the other on
the output price. The di¤erence is that, in the case of decreasing returns, the
size of these e¤ects is di¤erent and can be such that the indirect e¤ect on output
price may well overcome the direct e¤ect on the input price, leading nally to
a decrease of the downstream rmsprots when m increases.
Seade (1985) has shown that, under Cournot oligopoly, it is not necessar-
ily true that a decrease of production cost leads to an increase in prots, a
proposition analogous to ours. Seade (1985) uses conditions on the elasticity
on the market demand function to identify when decreasing cost can increase
prots. In our case, this phenomenon is obtained in a chain of markets and,
consequently, the condition bears on the technology of the downstream rms,
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as well on the relative number of rms in the markets.
5 Asymptotic properties of input and output
prices
We have seen above that when downstream rms use a constant returns technol-
ogy, asymptotically, both these prices tend to the corresponding marginal costs.
This property fails to hold in our example of a decreasing returns technology!
Contrary to intuition, we show in the next proposition that, under decreasing
returns, the input price may well not converge to its marginal cost
Proposition 2 There exists decreasing returns technologies for which the equi-
librium input price does not converge to upstream rmsmarginal cost, when
the number of replications of the basic economy tends to innity:
Proof. see Appendix 3.
The intuition of this proposition can be described as follows. Under the de-
creasing returns technology f(z) =
p
z, the equilibrium quantity produced by
each downstream rm tends to zero when the number of replicas tends to inn-
ity. Accordingly, the marginal product of input tends itself to innity, making
impossible the equality of supply and demand in the upstream market. The
volume of input demand can be matched with input supply only by dampen-
ing demand with a price which remains strictly higher than the marginal cost
of producing the input, whatever the number of replicas3 . In the linear case,
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marginal productivity remains constant whatever large the number of replicas,
which prevents a similar phenomenon to arise.
Finally, comparing the market solution with constant and decreasing re-
turns technology in the downstream market, we can compare the size of double
marginalization and the e¤ects of collusive agreements.
6 Double marginalization under constant vs de-
creasing returns
It is well known that the vertical integration of a downstream monopolist and an
upstream monopolist is protable, because the prot of the integrated entity will
exceed the combined prots corresponding to market solution ex-ante the agree-
ment. The reason for this is the presence of double marginalisation. This result
is extended to successive oligopolies in Gaudet and Van Long (1996), where the
technology of downstream rms is assumed to be constant returns. Here, we
address the size of double marginalization according to the type of technology
used by downstream rms to produce the output: decreasing or constant re-
turns. Double marginalization is dened as the sum of the markup exercised by
the upstream rms, p   ; and the markup applied by the downstream rms,
   p; which yields    : Therefore, to compare double marginalization ac-
cording to the downstream technology, we compare output prices under the two
technologies. From the direct comparison of output prices we obtain that:
Proposition 3 Double marginalization is lower when downstream rms use
13
the decreasing returns technology f(z) =
p
z than under the constant returns
technology f(z) = z.
Proof. see Appendix 3.
This di¤erence in the size of double marginalization, due to the technology,
is important because it entails di¤erent consequences of vertical agreements on
protability of mergers, as we now see in the next section4 .
7 The e¤ects of technology on collusive agree-
ments
Collusive agreements between upstream and downstream rms eliminate double
marginalization, which yields lower prices for the consumers of the nal product.
On the other hand, these vertical integration agreements can lead to foreclosure
of rivals rms in the downstream market, which has the opposite e¤ect on the
price of the nal product. Finally, the global e¤ect depends on the size of double
marginalization; which itself depends, as shown before, on the technology used
by the downstream rms. In this section, we use the above example of decreasing
returns technology in successive oligopolies, to analyze and compare the e¤ects of
vertical integration according to the technology used in the downstream market.
Collusive agreements reduce the total number of decision units operating in
the downstream and upstream markets and, thus, the corresponding number
of oligopolists in each of them (see Salant, Schwitzer and Reynolds (1983)).
Collusive outcomes are the Cournot equilibria corresponding to this reduced
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number of oligopolists in each market.
Assume that k downstream rms i, i = 1; :::; k; say; and h upstream rms
j; j = 1; :::; h; say, collude and maximize joint prots (notice that all rms,
h + k; merge in one entity). We assume that k < n and h < m 5 . After this
merger, we move from an initial situation comprising globally n +m rms to
a new one, with n   k + 1 rms in the downstream market and m   h in the
upstream one. Indeed, the integrated entity now internalizes output production
by using the input provided by the h upstream rms belonging to the new entity.
This general formulation covers as particular cases mergers including either only
downstream rms, or only upstream ones, which correspond to the usual case
of horizontal merging of rms.
The payo¤ of the integrated rm I is given by
I(qI;q I) = (1  qI  
X
k 6=I
qk)qI   q2I :
where qI denotes the quantity of output produced by the integrated entity. As
for the downstream rms i; i 6= I; not belonging to the integrated entity, they
have as payo¤s6
i(qi; qI;q i) = (1  qi  
nX
k 6=i
qk)qi   pq2i ): (11)
Following the upstream and the downstream games explained above, we derive
in Appendix 3, the equilibrium output and input quantities and prices, for the
entity of h + k rms and the non-integrated upstream and downstream rms.
Comparing these variables with those obtained when downstream rms use a
linear technology, it is possible to analyze how collusive agreements can be
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a¤ected by technology.
To this end, using an illustration with two downstream and three upstream
rms, we show that a collusive agreement between one downstream and one up-
stream rm can have diametrically opposite consequences depending on whether
the technology is constant, or decreasing returns (see Gabszewicz and Zanaj
2007). In the rst case, the collusive agreement leads to a decrease in both
the input and output prices, while the reverse holds under decreasing returns.
Moreover, the protability of mergers also depends on technology. Indeed, with
constant returns, it can be shown that when n = m = 7; only vertical integra-
tion of one downstream and one upstream rm can be protable. These results
are very di¤erent from those obtained when rms in the downstream rm use
constant returns, as in Salinger (1988). For the same parametric values, Salinger
(1988) shows that under vertical integration, the number of protable mergers
is much larger.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the down-
stream rms share the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas
type. We stress the di¤erences between the conclusions obtained under this
assumption and those resulting from the traditional example considered in the
literature, namely, a constant returns technology. We nd that when rms use
a decreasing returns technology rather than a linear one: (i) the prot of a
16
downstream rm can decrease, when the upstream market is more competitive;
(ii) the input price does not tend to the corresponding marginal cost when the
number of rms in both markets tends to innite; (iii) double marginalization
is lower and, nally, (iv) vertical integration may arise less frequently, and may
lead to higher prices for nal consumers. These discrepancies between market
behavior corresponding to alternative technological conditions reveal how fragile
are the theoretical conclusions obtained when analyzing the interplay of rms
strategies in successive markets only using a linear technology in the down-
stream market, as it is done so far in the literature. To get robust conclusions,
a general theoretical framework for analyzing successive oligopolistic markets is
clearly required.
References
[1] Debreu G. and Scarf H., "A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy",
1963, International Economic Review, Vol. 4, 235-246
[2] Gabszewicz J. J. and Zanaj S., 2007, "A note on vertical mergers and
successive oligopolies", Communication & strategies, Volume 4th quarter
2007, Issue: 68.
[3] Gaudet G. and Van Long N., "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Prots
in the Presence of Double Marginalisation", Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, 1996, Vol. 5(3), 409-432
17
[4] Hansen, T. and Gabszewicz, J., 1972. "Collusion of factor owners and dis-
tribution of social output," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(1),
pages 1-18, February.
[5] Hart O. and Tirole J., 1990, "Vertical integration and market foreclosure",
Brookings papers on economic activity: Microeconomics, 205:286.
[6] Ordover, J. and Saloner, G. and Salop, S.: "Equilibrium vertical foreclo-
sure", American Economic Review, 1990, Vol. 80, 127-142
[7] Salant S., Schwitzer Sh. and Reynolds R. , Losses from Horizontal Merger:
The E¤ects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-
Nash Equilibrium, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983, Vol. 98,
185-99
[8] Salinger M., "Vertical mergers and market foreclosure", The Quartely Jour-
nal of Economics, 1988, Vol. 103, 345-356
[9] Seade J, 1985, "Protable cost increases and the shifting of taxation :
equilibrium responses of markets in oligopoly", Warwick discussion papers,
n 260.
[10] Tirole, J., 1989, The theory of Industrial Organisation. Cambridge: MIT
press
Notes
18
1This assumption guarantees that the marginal cost of producing the input does not exceed
its marginal product in the production of output.
2 In the  th-replica, the prices at which demand is equal to supply both in the downstream
and upstream markets, do not depend on the number ; but depend only on m and n: Indeed,
at the symmetric equilibrium in the upstream market, the input quantities supplied by the
m upstream rms have to be multiplied by  in the  th-replica; similarly for the quantities
demanded by the n downstream rms in the downstream market. Consequently, the equality
of supply and demand in the upstream market eliminates the   factor in each side of the
equality. A similar reasoning applies for the symmetric price equilibrium in the downstream
market. It follows that the study of the behaviour of the upstream and downstream markets
when the number of replicas increases is equivalent to the study of the limit equilibrium prices
and quantities, when the number of rms is n and m ; instead of n and m; in each market,
respectively. This replication procedure thus leads to increase, simultaneously and at the same
speed, the number of rms in each market.
3 It would be interesting to extend this result to the general class of decreasing returns Cobb-
Douglas production functions f(z) = z;  < 1: Unfortunately, it turns out the solutions of
the model leads to cumbersome computations when  6= 1
2
:
4Here, we are interested in successive Cournot oligopolies and consequently in the size of
double marginalization. Clearly, if rms play Bertrand or prices are not linear, for instance,
rms can use two-part tari¤s, double marginalisation disappears. In this cases, the cause and
the protability of vertical agreements are di¤erent (Tirole, 1989, and Hart and Tirole, 1990).
5This assumption guarantees that there always exists at least one unintegrated rm on
each side of the upstream market so that the integrated entity cannot exclude the unintegrated
downstream rms to have access to the input. A similar assumption in another approach to
collusion has been used by Gabszewicz and Hansen (1972).
6Notice that the set fk : k 6= ig includes the index I:
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Appendix 1: Decreasing returns technology
In this section of the Appendix we derive the equilibrium quantities and prices
when downstream rms use decreasing returns technology. The prots of the
ith downstream rm at the vector of strategies (qi; q i) obtains as
i(qi; q i) = (1  qi   k 6=iqk)qi   pq2i :
Taking the rst derivative and solving it in q; we get at the symmetric solution
q(p) =
1
(n+ 2p+ 1)
; i = 1:::n: (12)
Similarly, re-expressing equation (??), and solving it for s; we obtain
s(p) =
   p(ms)
@p(ms)=@s
: (13)
The input price p must satisfy the system of equations n (q(p))2 = ms(p),
(12) and (13). To derive the explicit equilibrium price, we can proceed as follows.
First, we identify the total demand for input at the symmetric solution of the
rst game, using (12) namely n(n+2p+1) : Then, using the input clearing market
condition, the equality n
(n+2p+1)2
= mk=1sk(p) has to be satised at any vector
of strategies (s1;:::; sj ; ::sm) in the input market. Accordingly, the equality
p(mk=1sk) =
r
n
4mk=1sk
  n+ 1
2
: (14)
must hold for any vector of strategies in the input market. Substituting (14)
into the prot function of an upstream rm,  j(sj ; s j) we have
 j(sj ; s j) = (
r
n
4mk=1sk
  n+ 1
2
)sj   sj ;
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Notice that the prot function  j(sj ; s j) is concave in sj ; j = 1; :::m; so that
we can use the rst order necessary and su¢ cient conditions to characterize an
equilibrium. Accordingly, at the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the upstream
game, we obtain
s(m;n) =
n (2m  1)2
4m3 (2 + 1 + n)
2 :
Hence the prot  j(m;n) of an upstream rm at the symmetric equilibrium of
the upstream game obtains as
 j(m;n) =
n(2m  1)
8 (n+ 2 + 1)m3
:
Finally, the equilibrium price p(m;n) in the input market obtains as
p(m;n) =
n+ 1 + 4m
2 (2m  1) :
Consequently, substituting this equilibrium price into the equilibrium quantities
qof output selected by the downstream rms, as given by (12), we get
q(m;n) =
2m  1
2m (2 + n+ 1)
so that, given the technology, the equilibrium input quantities used by down-
stream rms writes as
z(m;n) =
(2m  1)2
4m2 (2 + n+ 1)
2
Therefore, the resulting output price (m;n) in the downstream market obtains
as
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(m;n) = 1  n (2m  1)
2m (2 + n+ 1)
:
The prot i(m;n) of a downstream rm at equilibrium in the corresponding
game is thus equal to
i(m;n) =
1
8
(4m + 4m+ n  1) 2m  1
m2 (2 + n+ 1)
2 :
Notice that i > 0; - a requirement needed to guarantee the survival of rms
in the downstream market.
Appendix 2: Proofs of propositions
Proposition 1:
Proof. The derivative of the prot of a downstream rm is 3m+n mn 1+2m
4(n+1)2m3
:
Hence, the sign depends only on the sign of the numerator, 3m+n mn 1+2m:
The derivative is positive i¤ m < 1 n2+3 n ; and negative i¤ m >
1 n
2+3 n . It is
immediate that the last expression is always true for  > n 32 :
Proposition 2:
Proof. We consider the situation where the number of replicas  tends to
innity. So, we calculate the limit for  ! +1 of the expression for the input
price:
lim
!1 p
(m; n) =
1
4
n
m
+ :
Clearly, the price p at the limit does not converge to ; unless m converges to
innite more quickly than n:
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Proposition 3:
Proof. Consider (1+m+n)+mn(n+1)(m+1) +
n(2m 1)
2m(2+n+1) < 1:We prove that the inequality
is false. It is easy to check that the rst derivative with respect to  of each
side of the left hand side of the inequality is negative. We know that   1:
Therefore, assuming  = 1; we can consider the inequality (1+m+n)+mn(n+1)(m+1) +
n(2m 1)
2m(2+n+1) < 1 where we just make the left hand side bigger. The solution of
such inequality is a subset of the original inequality.
Solving for ; we nd that it is true only for  < 0: This is not an admissible
set of ; therefore the inequality is false, and the price with decreasing returns
technology is smaller than the price with constant returns.
Appendix 3: Vertical integration solution
Following the solution of the game in the benchmark model, at the symmetric
equilibrium in the upstream market, each unintegrated rm supplies a quantity
sj of input which obtains as
s(k; h) =
1
4
(2m  2h  1)2 (n  k)
(n  k + 2 + 2)2 (m  h)3 :
while the input price writes as
p(k; h) =
1
4 ( + 1)

(n  k + 2 + 2)

2 (2 + 1) (m  h)2   1

  2 (n  k)

:
Then, substituting p in the expression of qi and qI , we obtain
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qi(k; h) =
1
2 (n  k + 2 + 2) (m  h)2 ;
qI(k; h) =
2 (n  k + 2 + 2) (m  h)2   (n  k)
4 (n  k + 2 + 2) ( + 1) (m  h)2 :
The price of the output then obtains as
(k; h) = (1  1
2 (n  k + 2 + 2) (m  h)2 (n  k)
 2 (n  k + 2 + 2) (m  h)
2   (n  k)
4 (n  k + 2 + 2) ( + 1) (m  h)2 ):
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